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In June 2012 European Council launched the banking union as a new project expected
to contribute to solve the euro area crisis. Is banking union a necessary supplement to
monetary union or a new rush forward? A banking union would break the link between
the sovereign debt crisis and the banking crisis, by asking the ECB to supervise banks, by
establishing common mechanisms to solve banking crises, and by encouraging banks to
diversify their activities. The banking union project is based on three pillars: a Single Super-
visory Mechanism (SSM), a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), a European Deposit
Guarantee Scheme (EDGS). Each of these pillars raises specific problems. Some are related
to the current crisis (can deposits in euro area countries facing difficulties be guaranteed?);
some other issues are related to the EU complexity (should the banking union include all
EU member states? Who will decide on banking regulations?), some other issues are related
to the EU specificity (is the banking union a step towards more federalism?); the more
stringent are related to structural choices regarding the European banking system. Banks'
solvency and ability to lend, would depend primarily on their capital ratios, and thus on
financial markets' sentiment. The links between the government, firms, households and
domestic banks would be cut, which is questionable. Will governments be able tomorrow
to intervene to influence bank lending policies, or to settle specific public banks? An oppo-
site strategy could be promoted: restructuring the banking sector, and isolating retail
banking from risky activities. Retail banks would focus on lending to domestic agents, and
their solvency would be guaranteed by the interdiction to run risky activities on financial
markets. Can European peoples leave such strategic choices in the hands of the ECB?
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Since early 2011, the European authorities have tried to find
ways to solve the public debt crisis in the euro area. This crisis
revealed the drawbacks in the euro area organisation; they led to a
rise in imbalances between euro area countries from 1999 to 2007;
they did not allow the implementation of a common economic
strategy after the 2008 financial crisis. The 28-29 June 2012 Euro-
pean Council was a new attempt from European bodies and
member states to solve the euro area crisis. A new project emerged:
the banking union, which was more precisely defined at the 13
December 2012 Summit. Is banking union a necessary supplement
to monetary union or a new rush forward? 
The current crisis is originally a banking crisis. Prior to the crisis,
European banks had fed the rise in the financial and housing (espe-
cially in Spain and Ireland) bubbles; they had invested in risky
investment or in hedge funds in the US;2 they were making a
significant part of their profits on financial markets, but were
risking their own funds. They experienced significant losses due to
the 2007-2009 crisis and the burst of the bubbles.3 Governments
had to come to their rescue, which was particularly costly for
Germany, the UK, Spain, and, above all, for Ireland.4 The euro area
sovereign debt crisis increased banks’ difficulties; public debts
which they held became risky assets. A dangerous resonance
appeared between the difficulties of public finances and those of
the banks of the same country. Doubts on public debt weaken
national banks which generally own a certain amount of govern-
ment bonds; markets consider that governments will have to
rescue domestic banks, which increases the fears on governments’
solvency and on capacity to support domestic banks (Pisani-Ferry
and Wolff, 2012). Mistrust grows in an uncontrollable vicious
circle. Last, the debt crisis destroyed the euro area unity and the
2. Euro area banks’ foreign assets in US dollars reached 4 trillion dollars in 2008, four times the
figure for US banks’ assets in European currencies (Baba et al., 2009). 
3. Their writedowns related to US dollar-denominated non-bank assets are estimated at 423
billion dollars between 2007 and 2009 (McGuire and Von Peter, 2009). 
4. Between 2008 and October 2012, the approved amounts of rescue packages to financial
institutions reached 5.1trillion euros (40.3% of EU GDP), 365% of GDP for Ireland, 256% for
Denmark, 97% for Belgium. The amounts effectively used reached 1.6 trillion euros (12.8% of
EU GDP), 224% of GDP for Ireland, 66% for Denmark, 32% for Greece (European Commission,
2012 d). 
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notion of 'single currency': a Spanish company cannot borrow at
the same interest rate as a German one (Figure 1). 
Due to the liberalisation of capital movements, small countries
(Ireland, Iceland and Cyprus) developed banking systems far too
big for their size, and were unable to rescue them. The issue of
banking regulation is addressed at the international level (new
Basel III standards), in the United States (Volker rule and Dodd-
Frank Act) and in the United Kingdom (Vickers’ report). 
In June 2012, the robustness of European banks was once again
questioned. The measures introduced since 2008 to stabilise the
financial system turned out to be insufficient. When Bankia, the
fourth bank in Spain requested a 19 billion euros support from the
Spanish government, concerns on Spanish banks’ balance sheets
strongly rose. The share of bad debts in Spanish banks, whose
balance sheets have been weakened by the burst of the housing
bubble, rose from 3.3% at the end 2008 to 8.7% in June 2012, and
11.3% at the end of 2012 (according to the Bank of Spain). Further-
more, many European depositors reduced their domestic bank
deposits fearing their country could leave the euro area: during the
first half of 2012, bank deposits fell by 5.6% in Greece, 12% in
Ireland, 4.5% in Portugal. From June 2012, this started also to
Figure 1. Interest rates on short-term loans to non-financial companies
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occur in Spain: bank deposits declined by 90 billion euros in the
summer (Figure 2). The TARGET 2 system automatically re-lent to
Spanish banks the Spanish deposits held in German banks, but the
ESCB was thus playing a role of guarantee of Southern countries’
banking systems, which could be dangerous and raised the
concerns of German politicians and economists. 
In May 2012, in response to these risks, Mario Monti re-
launched the objective of a European banking union, taking up
projects already in preparation at the DG Internal Market and
Services of the European Commission. Germany was reluctant,
considering that there can be no banking union without a fiscal
union. Even though Angela Merkel acknowledged the importance
of having a European supervision with a supranational banking
authority, she refused that Germany takes the risk of new transfers
or guarantees, without enhanced budgetary and political integra-
tion. However, the banking union project received the support
from the European Commission, the ECB, and several countries
(Italy, France, Spain...), some wishing to accelerate the move
towards a federal Europe, some looking for a lifeline emergency.
Thus, the need for urgent action to save the euro area could have
heavy consequences, with reforms implemented too rapidly,
without fully considering their consequences. 
Figure 2. Bank deposits
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The banking union would, according to its proponents, break
the nexus between sovereign debt crisis and banking crisis, by
entrusting bank supervision at the EU level, implementing
common mechanisms for banking crises resolution and for deposit
guarantee, and encouraging banks to diversify their activities and
their loans in Europe. It would help to unify credit and deposit
markets in Europe (see Dai and Sarfati, 2012, Pisani et al., 2012).
Conversely, it would introduce in each country a break between
banks on the one hand, governments and national companies on
the other hand. It would be a new step towards federalism by a new
transfer of competence from the Member States to European
authorities. The project raises again unresolved issues: can there be
an economic and monetary union without a fiscal and political
union? Is there any limit to EU integration? How to take national
differences into account?
Can banking union offset four major drawbacks of the Mone-
tary Union: the absence of a “lender of last resort”, which allows
financial markets to bet on the possible bankruptcy of States; the
absence of rigid solidarity, control or coordination mechanisms
which weakens the single currency; the inability to implement a
crisis exit strategy, which has led several economies to fall and
remain in recession, which weakens further their banking system;
the fact that a single interest rate set by the ECB, with arbitrary risk
premia requested by financial markets, leads to uncontrollable
credit conditions in member countries?
Such a banking union would be based on three pillars: 
— A Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). 
— A Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM).
— A European deposit guarantee scheme.
Each of these pillars is subject to specific problems. Some of this
problems are related to the complexity of the functioning of the
EU (Is banking union limited to the euro area or does it include all
EU countries?) some others to the crisis context (should Europe
guarantee depositors against the exit of their country from the
euro area? Should Europe support banks already facing difficul-
ties?), some others linked to the EU specificity (Is banking union a
step towards more federalism? How to reconcile it with national
prerogatives?), finally other problems linked to structural choices
on the functioning of the European banking system (should there
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be a better surveillance of a European banking system, which is
internationally diversified and integrated to financial markets?
Should banks refocus their activity on their core business, credits
and deposits?).
However on 29 June 2012, the euro area summit agreed that the
Commission would make proposals for a SSM for euro area banks
(European council, 2012b), which was the condition for allowing
the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to directly recapitalise
banks, thus breaking the vicious circle. 
On 18 October 2012, the Council launched the legislative work
on a banking union while insisting on the need to strengthen the
surveillance of fiscal policies (six-pack, two-pack, Fiscal Compact),
by the monitoring of macroeconomic imbalances and by
increasing incentives for structural reforms. 
On 13 and 14 December 2012, the Council agreed on the SSM,
giving the ECB the full responsibility for the European banks
supervision. This allowed launching the trilogue discussion with
the European Parliament. On 12 September 2013, the European
Parliament agreed to set up the SSM. These powers will be effective
from September 2014.
With regard to the SRM, on June 2013, the Council agreed on
the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), proposed by
the EU Commission in June 2012. An agreement with the Euro-
pean Parliament was announced on 20 December 2013. An
intergovernmental agreement on a Single Resolution Board (SRB)
and a Single Resolution Fund (SRF) was announced on 18
December 2013, but no agreement has yet been reached with the
European Parliament.
We will analyse the issues and problems of each of these three
pillars, and we will then discuss the future model of the banking
system in the European banking union. 
1. A Single Supervisory Mechanism 
The objective of setting up a single European banking supervisor
is to have an independent and powerful institution supervising
European banks. The arguments in favour of such a supervisor are
the same as for an independent central bank. Banks, like money,
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should escape from the political sphere to be entrusted to experts.
Banking supervision by an independent supranational authority
prevents national or political factors to influence decisions and
strengthens the credibility of strict rules (Rochet, 2008). An inde-
pendent supervisor will be credible when asserting that not all
banks will be necessarily bailed out in the event of bankruptcy,
which will encourage banks to reduce their risks. This will reduce
the moral hazard of banks otherwise encouraged to take risks under
the insurance of being bailed out by their State. Independence also
ensures shorter delays for the implementation of bankruptcy
procedures, delays that are detrimental to the effectiveness of the
adopted resolution procedure and create the possibility of lobbying
actions limiting the credibility of the overall scheme. The super-
visor should be able to monitor banks in trouble before they
become a threat to financial sector stability. Speculation on bank
failures which has fed the crisis, would be substantially reduced.
Confidence depends strongly on the quality of supervision. Uncer-
tainties about the quality of the banking sector, on its
capitalisation, on the amount of bad debts caused difficulties for
banks to refinance themselves on the interbank market.
The European banking supervisor should facilitate the imple-
mentation of the common scheme of crisis resolution, by acting
both in normal times and in times of crises for the resolution of
bankruptcy procedures. Finally, it will monitor the implementa-
tion of the new Basel III standards. From 1 January 2014, banks
will have to increase the level and quality of their capital: the Core
Tier 1 ratio (comprising core equity: common stock and retained
earnings) should increase from 2 to 4.5% of banks' assets, while the
TIER 1 ratio should stand at 6% at least, versus 4% previously.
The single banking supervision should enable to set up both a
single mechanism of deposit guarantee and a single mechanism for
assistance to banks in difficulty (Véron and Wolff, 2013).
There has been a debate on whether the European banking
authority (EBA) or the ECB should be in charge of the SSM. The
EBA was founded in November 2010 to improve the EU banking
system supervision and is a young institution. It already ran two
series of “stress tests” on banks. In October 2011, Bankia’s tests
results pointed to a 1.3 billion deficit of core capital. Five months
later, this deficit was 23 billion. This weakened the EBA’s credi-
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bility. Moreover, the EBA has no national correspondents; it is
based in London, and has authority on the British system while the
United Kingdom does not wish to be part of the banking union. 
The ECB lobbied to be entrusted with this task. Hence, Mr
Constancio, Vice-president of the ECB, said on 12 June 2012, that
“the ECB and the Eurosystem are prepared” to receive these
powers; “there is therefore no need to create a new institution”.
Section 127.6 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European
Union,5 quoted at the 29 June euro area summit, makes it possible
to give supervisory authority to the ECB.
Financial stability is already an objective of national central
banks and the latter already had a role in the banking sector super-
vision. In France, for example, the Prudential Supervisory
Authority is responsible for the agreement and supervision of
banks and insurance institutions; it an independent authority, but
remains backed by the Bank of France. 
The European Commission estimated that the ECB has an estab-
lished reputation of political independence. The ECB’s good
knowledge of the interbank market, of liquidity in circulation, of
the situation and reputation of each bank was an advantage over
an independent agency. 
So, the Commission chose the ECB to conduct banking supervi-
sion within a single supervisory mechanism (SSM) including the
ECB and the existing national prudential authorities (European
Commission, 2012 a). The ECB will receive the responsibility of
monitoring missions for all the participating member states’ credit
institutions, regardless of their business model and their size. It
will ensure the implementation of standards for the degree of
leverage, of liquidity, of own funds and it may, in coordination
with the national authorities, impose the constitution of capital
buffer or the introduction of corrective measures as deemed neces-
sary. It will be the relevant authority to approve credit institutions.
It will ensure the coherent application of the EBA single rulebook.
5. Art 127.6 “The Council, acting by means of regulations in accordance with a special legislative procedure,
may unanimously, and after consulting the European Parliament and the European Central Bank, confer
specific tasks upon the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of
credit institutions and other financial institutions with the exception of insurance undertakings.”
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In addition to its role as lender of last resort, the ECB would
thus be responsible for supervising all banks in the banking union,
but it will directly supervise banks with assets amounting to more
than 30 billion euros or at least 20% of GDP of the country where
their headquarters are located, as well as the banks which will
request or receive assistance from the ESM, i.e. 200 banks on a total
of 6 000 banks in Europe (European Commission, 2013c). It will
monitor the supervision of other banks which will be conducted
by national supervisory authorities, who will be accountable to the
ECB. The ECB may decide, at any time, to supervise any credit
institution. The SSM will benefit from the expertise of national
supervisory authorities. The ECB shall have access to all the infor-
mation available to national supervisors. As the ECB is an EU
institution, it will be possible to appeal a decision according to the
principles defined in the European treaties. 
The ECB’s new prerogatives as a single supervisor will have to
take into account the presence of non-euro area countries in the
banking union. Non-euro area EU countries are already repre-
sented in the ECB within the General Council which brings
together all the governors of central banks of the EU. But currently
this Council does not have any power. A fair distribution of powers
between euro and non-euro area countries on European banking
supervision is going to be very delicate within the ECB, this institu-
tion being primarily the Central Bank of euro area countries. So the
European Parliament decided that all countries participating to the
SSM are entitled to the same representativeness within the Council
who will lead the supervision tasks of the ECB. In fact, in January
2014, the UK, Sweden and the Czech Republic already announced
that they will not participate; no non-Euro area EU country has
already decided to join the SSM.
A Supervisory Board (SB) and fully independent services will
have to be created within the ECB to avoid conflict with the mone-
tary policy objective. The SB would have six members from the
ECB (the Chair, the Vice-Chair and four other members) and repre-
sentatives of each national supervisor (which may be the national
central bank or a separate authority). However the Board of Gover-
nors will have a right of veto on all decisions. To ensure the
democratic legitimacy of the process, the Commission claims that
the project ensures “strong accountability safeguards, notably vis-
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à-vis the European Parliament and the Council” (European
Commission, 2012 b). In practice, the ECB will have to present to
the European Parliament the key points of the supervisory board’s
minutes and the appointment of the Chair and of the Vice-Chair
of the Supervisory Board will have to be approved by the Parlia-
ment. The supervisory power of the ECB voted on 12 September
2013 will be fully effective in November 2014, one year after the
entry into force of the texts. 
The Commission claims that the ECB will take no mission from
the EBA, whose mandate in the European monitoring mechanism
was specified (European Commission, 2012b): the EBA should
elaborate a common legal framework for surveillance through a
single rulebook for banking supervision in Europe, including the
countries which would not be part of banking union. It should also
provide the texts of laws that will govern the management of
banking crises in the euro area. It should ensure regular stress tests
on European banks. The EBA may make decisions on the double
majority (group of countries subject to the SSM, group of countries
not subject to it), which in practice gives a right of veto to the UK.
So the EBA existence allows the UK to maintain a link with the
banking union. 
The ECB and the EBA are expected to work closely within the
European Systemic Risk Board, responsible for alerting the Euro-
pean authorities about banking and financial instability risks in
Europe. It is not yet certain that this committee will have an effec-
tive role, in the absence of any established doctrine and of any
strong will.
1.1. Delicate transfers of sovereignty for a single supervision 
The risk is great that entrusting these issues to the ECB is a new
step towards the de-politicisation of Europe. Certainly, the Euro-
pean authorities claim that the ECB will be subject to enhanced
transparency and democratic accountability requirements.
Although the President of the ECB is often heard by the European
Parliament, the Parliament control remains formal; the ECB main-
tains a full independence vis-à-vis national governments and
European institutions. Although a Monitoring Committee is
created, the Governing Council will remain responsible for
banking supervision and monetary policy decisions. Despite the
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creation of a single supervisory mechanism including national
authorities, the ECB will make decisions in full independence, and
simply has to “account for” and “reply to parliamentary questions”
but these decisions will not be questionable, as is the case today
with monetary policy decisions.
Will the ECB be able to account for European banks diversity?
The European Parliament says that it will be one of its duties but it
does not explain how financial institutions diversity will be
preserved (Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, Euro-
pean Parliament, 2012). The single rulebook on which the EBA
works and which must serve as a code of conduct for the ECB advo-
cates a uniform regulation for all European banks. However,
should governance or the capital ratio be the same for a small
German retail bank and a large European banking institution? 
One should have considered a dual system: the ECB would
manage large transnational banks and national regulators would
supervise national and regional banks and would preserve their
specificities. However, national regulators are facing today unequal
risks: they are facing much bigger risks in Southern countries
(Greece, Spain, and Portugal) than in Germany or Finland. A dual
system would have risked accelerating the withdrawal of deposits
from medium-size banks in Southern countries. 
The main point is the objective for the European banking
system: large transnational banks, with cross-border deposits or
credits, with substantial financial markets activities, or national
and regional banks of reduced sizes, well inserted into real
economic activities. 
Banks are encouraged to diversify internationally to reduce
their risks. But the crisis showed the dangers of diversification on
foreign markets where banks are not familiar with.6 Banks lose
contact with domestic firms, which deteriorate the quality of
credit. Local authorities would no longer have dedicated banks.
6. For instance, studying micro-level data on 105 Italian banks over 1993–1999, Acharya et al.
(2002) show empirical evidence of diseconomies of diversification for certain banks which
expand their activities in industries where they face a high degree of competition or lack prior
lending experience. This generates an increase in credit risk of loan portfolios or poor
monitoring incentives.
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Governments will lose their ability to influence bank credit
supply, which, for many people, is desirable (no political influence
on credit supply), but is dangerous in our opinion: governments
will lose an industrial policy tool that could be used to finance small
and medium size firms, or to promote environmental transition. 
For instance, in the case of the Dexia bank, the opposition
between on the one hand the European Commission and on the
other hand France, Belgium and Luxembourg, has for a long time
blocked the plan to dismantle the bank. This plan includes the
resumption of financing activities of local French authorities of
Dexia by a public bank, created by the cooperation between the
Caisse des dépôts and the Banque Postale. On fair competition
grounds, Brussels questioned the financing of local authorities by
such a bank because Dexia received public aid for its dismantling
plan. This threatens the continuity of the financing of local French
authorities, could block their projects and especially forbid France
to provide specific and secure mechanisms to finance local projects
by local savings. 
Similarly, in October 2012, the French Government rescued the
BPF, Banque PSA Finance, the Bank financing the Peugeot group, in
order to avoid that PSA can no longer provide credit to its
customers. France guaranteed 7 billion euros of PSA bonds and got
a commitment from the BPF’s creditor banks to increase their
loans. Is this compatible with a banking union?
Finally, the French project of a public investment bank (Banque
publique d’investissement, BPI) is problematic in this context. This
bank should provide credit according to specific criteria, linked
with the French industrial policy. The question of the compati-
bility of such a public institution with the banking union will arise.
European banks will have to account for different national regu-
lations on interest income taxation, special deposits regulation or
financing circuit organisation. Is this compatible with the banking
union or does convergence need to be organised? And who will
decide about it? 
In any case, the SSM does not address the question of how to
ensure similar credit conditions in different countries sharing the
same currency but in different economic situations. In the recent
past, equal nominal interest rates encouraged rising debt in coun-
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tries with strong growth and inflation. Today, interest rates are
strongly influenced by risk premia imposed by markets, with no
link to the macroeconomic situation.
It is difficult to assess if there will be (and if there should be) a
Chinese wall between bank supervision and monetary policy (see
Beck and Gros, 2012, for a discussion). The two functions are
closely correlated when the Central Banks provide liquidity to
banks, especially in times of crisis. Some economists (Goodhart,
2000 or Darvas and Merler, 2013) have raised the possibility that
the Central Bank’s role as banks’ supervisor may enter into conflict
with its objective of maintaining price stability. In the future, the
ECB may decide not to raise interest rates, when necessary, in order
to avoid downgrading banks’ financial position. But this problem
is not specific to the SSM implementation; it is always a concern
for monetary policy that a strong interest rise deteriorates the
balance sheet of some financial agents.
One could imagine that the ECB implements diversified macro-
prudential policies imposing higher capital ratios to banks in coun-
tries in economic expansion and lower ratios for countries in
difficulty. But this raises three questions: the macro-prudential
logic will go in the opposite direction of the micro-prudential one;
this implies that banks remain national; the ECB’s strategy is likely
to go in the opposite direction of the economic and fiscal strategy
of the Member State (MS). Will the ECB punish a country running
a too expansionary policy according to the Bank views by
imposing strong capital ratios to its banks? In 2014, for instance, a
MS like France may want domestic banks to increase credit supply
to French firms to support an industrial recovery, but the ECB may
consider this is a dangerous strategy for French banks financial
stability. Diversified macroprudential policies would require a MS-
well-defined coordination of European monetary policy, country-
specific monetary measures and domestic fiscal policies which is
not on the European agenda today.
A common vision on the banking system regulation is a prereq-
uisite to European supervision. An agreement needs to be reached
on crucial questions such as: is it necessary to separate retail banks
from investment banks? Should banks be prevented to intervene on
financial markets for their own profit? Should we promote the
development of public, mutual, or regional banks or on the contrary
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the development of internationalised banks? Should we encourage
banks to supply credit primarily to households, businesses and
governments of their countries of origin or on the contrary to diver-
sify? Will macro-prudential rules be national or European? On each
of these issues, the MS, the Commission, the ECB, and the EBA may
have different points of view: who will decide? 
Of course, in theory, it would be easier and more legitimate to
rescue banks under a single supervision. But this prospect is hardly
useful in the current crisis, where the problem is to help banking
systems already in trouble in Spain, Cyprus, Ireland, or Slovenia. 
Southern countries’ current difficulties oblige the entire euro
area to a rapid and full centralisation of banking regulation, the
defaults of which may appear in a few years. In our view there is a
major risk that euro area countries agree in emergency to enter a
dangerous path, and that the banking union is as badly analysed
ex-ante as were the single currency, the Stability and Growth Pact,
the Fiscal treaty.
The Cypriot crisis has highlighted the difficulties of a European
supervision. The European banking system is currently highly
heterogeneous. Banks’ balance-sheets-to-GDP ratios differ strongly
among countries (Table 1). In some countries, banks have a signifi-
cant share of deposits from non-residents. Does the SSM need to
make national systems converge or can it accommodate their
diversity? 
The risk is that the banking union leads to conflicting situations
between national strategies on banking and financial matters and
the ECB, either because some countries may wish to keep certain
public or regional features in their banking system, or because
some others will want to maintain their predatory features (to
attract foreign deposits). Economic issues will also arise: will
governments still have the responsibility and the ability to influ-
ence credit policy either according to the real estate market
developments, or to the macroeconomic context? 
In November 2013, ECB undertook a comprehensive assess-
ment of the euro area banking system before assuming its
supervisory tasks in November 2014. The ECB’s note (ECB, 2013)
gives a provisional list of the 123 concerned banks and confirms
that no non euro area country will participate. “The exercise will
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comprise a supervisory risk assessment, an asset quality review and
a stress test”. Common methodologies will be developed in these
three areas. The ECB may require corrective action as recapitalisa-
tion, profit retention, equity issuance, assets’ sales. Capital
shortfalls for viable banks should be provided by private capital or,
if private capital is insufficient, by public backstops. After this exer-
cise, the ECB will have a clear view of the situation of the European
banks and will be able to take the responsibility to supervise them.
The process should increase the confidence about banks’ situa-
tions: if some European banks are not in a viable situation, their
case should be resolved in 2014. The limitation (or maybe the
strength) of this exercise is that the ECB is both judge and party.
Table 1. Banks’ consolidated balance sheets-to-GDP ratios
2007 2012
Luxembourg 27.3 20.2
Malta 6.8 7.8
Cyprus 5.8 7.2
Ireland 8.5 6.9
United Kingdom 4.8 4.9
Netherlands 3.8 4.2
France 3.6 3.8
Spain 2.9 3.5
Portugal 2.6 3.4
Austria 3.2 3.2
Germany 3.1 3.1
Finland 1.6 3.1
Sweden 2.5 3.0
Belgium 3.9 2.9
Italy 2.1 2.7
Greece 1.7 2.3
Slovenia 1.2 1.4
Latvia 1.5 1.3
Estonia 1.3 1.1
Poland 0.8 0.9
Slovakia 1.0 0.8
Euro Area 3.2 3.4
Source: ECB.
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The ECB must assess the riskiness of MS public debts, which
depends on its willingness to guarantee them or to respond to
speculative attacks. It must evaluate the size of macroeconomic
shocks that banks should be able to resist, but this size depends on
the ability of the ECB to implement countercyclical policies and
the banks resilience depends on the ECB’s willingness to help them
in a strong recession. So, the ECB evaluation is not neutral; it can
be seen as a commitment to rescue the banks proclaimed healthy.
Box 1.  Banking regulation in the United States
In the US, banking supervision is dual: it adapts to the two types of US
banks: national banks (intervening at the federal level) and State banks
(specific to each State). Supervision is carried out by the Fed and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The Federal Reserve
membership is mandatory for national banks and optional for State
banks. In the event of joining, banks must subscribe to their regional
reserve Bank and deposit the corresponding reserves. The Fed is inde-
pendent of the government as it is ultimately accountable to the
Congress which establishes the key macroeconomic objectives for
monetary policy and as members of the Board of Governors and the
Chairman are confirmed by the Congress. The Fed regulates and super-
vises the banks which are members of the Federal Reserve and the Bank
Holding Companies system (12% of commercial banks and through the
BHC 96% of commercial banks’ assets). It sets the level of mandatory
reserves. The FDIC is an independent agency of the federal government
and receives no Congressional appropriations. The five members of its
Board of Directors are appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate. It is responsible for the supervision of State banks that are not
members of the Federal Reserve System. It is also responsible for bank
bankruptcy procedures resolutions and ensures the continuum of
prudential policy and resolutions procedures.
2. A single resolution mechanism (SRM) 
Until now, within the European Union, the legal provisions
governing bank failures were country-specific. In some countries,
like the UK, banks are submitted to the general code of firms bank-
ruptcy and thus to a judicial procedure. Other countries, such as
France have mixed regimes: an administrative procedure
conducted by the banks’ supervisor coexists with a judicial proce-
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dure; this allows to take into account the specificity of the banking
sector (for instance, to involve other banks in the procedure; to
protect the smaller deposits). 
In June 2012, the European Commission proposed to establish a
single resolution mechanism (SRM). This SRM will be based on the
Bank Recovery and Resolution and Directive (BRRD) agreed by the
Council in June 2013, by the trilogue in December 2013, but not
yet formally voted by the European Parliament. The scheme has
five pillars. The first one is to improve prevention by requiring
banks to establish wills, i.e. to provide strategies for recovery, or
even for dismantling, in case of crisis. The second gives the Euro-
pean banking authorities the power to intervene to implement
recovery plans and to change bank managers if the bank does not
meet the capital requirements. The third indicates that, if a bank
fails, national authorities will be able to take control of it and use
instruments of resolution such as the transfer of activities, the crea-
tion of a defeasance bank (a “bad bank”) or the bail-in. The bail-in
tool will give resolution authorities the power to write down the
claims of unsecured creditors of a failing institution and to convert
debt claims to equity. In the event of a bank failure, shareholders
will be affected first, then subordinated claims and, if necessary,
claims of higher categories. These claims could be transferred in
equity. Some liabilities are permanently protected: deposits below
100 000 euros, liabilities to employees, and inter-bank liabilities
with a less than seven days maturity. Others deposits (from individ-
uals or SMEs) could have a specific treatment. National resolution
authorities could also exclude liabilities to avoid contagion or value
destruction in some creditors. The fourth pillar requires MS to set
up a resolution fund, which must amount within 10 years, to 1% of
the covered deposits of all credit institutions, which would have to
finance it. The fund would provide temporary support to institu-
tions under resolution. But the share of losses between ordinary
creditors, privileged creditors and the resolution fund remains
uncertain. According to the fifth, Member States shall ensure that
the institutions maintain, at all times, a sufficient aggregate
amount of own funds and eligible liabilities expressed as a
percentage of the total liabilities of the institution (European
Commission, 2012) to absorb losses. This percentage is estimated to
be at least 10% but will be fixed in 2016 after a recommendation by
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the EBA. So, in principle, taxpayers would not have pay for the
creditors of insolvent banks. The EBA will have to set out the legis-
lative framework for these instruments of resolution. The
administrative body responsible for the resolution at the national
level is left to the discretion of each country: Central Bank, finance
ministry or a specific institution.
On 10 July 2013, the Commission proposed to move further
towards the SRM centralization (European Commission, 2013b).
The ECB would signal banks in difficulty to a Single Resolution
Board (SRB), consisting in representatives from the ECB, the
Commission and the supervisory authorities of the relevant
country). The SRB would propose a resolution procedure, which
would be formally decided by the Commission (as the SRB has no
constitutional existence) and implemented by the relevant
country under the SRB control. If a national resolution authority
does not comply with the decision of the Board, the latter could
address executive orders to the bank in trouble. National resolu-
tion funds would be replaced by a Single Bank Resolution Fund.
Due to the reluctance of some MS, particularly Germany, the draft
adopted by the Council on 18 December 2013 states that the
pooling of national resolution funds will be carried out gradually
in 10 years, from 2015 to 2025. It is only at this horizon that
banks financing or recapitalisation funds will be provided at the
European level. The decision to place a bank under the resolution
procedure will depend on the Resolution Fund Board, where sit
MS representatives (and not of the Commission or the ECB). The
restructuring projects will be developed by the Fund Board,
submitted to the Commission and then to the Council (this proce-
dure is not credible, taking into account the short delay required).
A MS will not be required to provide funds without the approval
of its Parliament. The Fund will be organised by an intra-govern-
ment agreement, i.e. without the European Parliament. This
project faces the reluctance of the European Parliament, which
would have preferred the immediate introduction of the Single
Resolution Fund at the EU level, so that the MS have no more
power in this matter. But, in our view an EU organization cannot
impose expenditures to MS public finances without their agree-
ment, and MS cannot accept to lose any power on their national
banks restructuring. 
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After an appropriate “burden-sharing” by private investors,
banks may benefit, for their recapitalisation, from funds from the
European Stability Mechanism (ESM), set up on October 8 2012.
The ESM will borrow on financial markets at low rates (it aims to be
AAA rated) and will be able to provide financial assistance to the
European countries in difficulty through a European assistance
under a Memorandum of Understanding. It will buy public debt bonds
on primary and secondary markets and will thus contribute to
lower interest rates. It will be able to mobilize 700 billion euros with
80 billion euros being effectively paid-up capital, the rest remaining
available if needed. According to the Treaty establishing the ESM,
the latter will have a status of senior creditor for public debts. When
the European supervisor is in place, the ESM will have the possi-
bility to recapitalise directly euro area banks in difficulty (and, in
this case, it will intervene without the senior creditor status).
Here also, this leaves open the question of the potential inter-
vention of the ESM for banks currently in difficulty. A choice needs
to be made between two strategies: either the ESM only benefits
banks subject to the SSM, which means that the ESM will only
intervene in the next crisis; or the ESM rescues banks currently in
difficulty because of the financial and economic crisis, which
means that the ESM will play a central role quickly.
If this mechanism works effectively, if the ESM supports, recapi-
talises and restructures all European banks in difficulty, it will be a
shareholder in a large number of banks. This would raise the issue
of the management of such participations. Is it the role of the ESM? 
The system introduced remains complicated, with the interven-
tion of the ECB (via the SSM), of the ESM, of the national
authorities of resolution and possibly of the deposit guarantee fund.
Box 2.  Banking crisis prevention and resolution 
in the United States
This European crisis resolution scheme belongs to early corrective
action policies which already exist in other countries. In the United
States, following the savings and loans crisis in the eighties, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act was adopted in 1991.
This text establishes a resolution framework structured in two pillars:
early corrective action and resolution at low cost. The first pillar is an
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“institutional response to the problem of capture of the regulator by the
regulated” (Scialom, 2006): its objective is to decrease the regulators
waiting propensity. Banking supervision and monitoring are done
through two tools: on-site inspections and reporting obligations. The
FDICIA determines the actions of the regulator and banks on the basis of
their capital ratios. When banks fall below established in advance levels
of funds, pre-defined corrective measures are applied. These measures
are: the suspension of bonuses and dividends, a plan for the recovery of
own resources, the obligation to recapitalise, the restriction of deposits
remuneration, the limitation of the payment of the executives’ compen-
sation, a placing under administration or the liquidation if the bank fails
its recapitalisation, the suspension of subordinated debt payments. The
FDIC may decide the bank liquidation if it remained more than 90 days
below the “critical undercapitalization” level. The codification of the
sanctions makes predictable the choice of regulator and prevents
arrangements between the bank and its regulator. The second pillar
means that the method of resolution chosen for a bank in difficulty
shall be the one which minimizes the cost of liquidation for FDIC.
2.1. A not-yet credible crisis resolution scheme
According to Finance Watch (2013), it is not sure that these
dispositions could avoid a full taxpayer protection, if banks remain
interconnected and too big. If a systemic bank is in financial diffi-
culty, it would be difficult to report its losses on other credit
institutions without creating a contagion effect. The scheme would
require first to reduce the banks’ size and to separate financial and
market activities from credit activities. 
A perverse effect of the projected crises resolution scheme is
that the potential involvement of shareholders and subordinated
creditors would make banks’ shares and claims much riskier.
Banks’ reluctance towards the interbank credit and the drying up
of the interbank market will persist; banks will find it difficult to
issue securities and will have to increase their remuneration. Banks
will be subject to financial markets’ appreciation. However, Basel
III standards require banks to link their credit distribution to their
own funds. The risk is that banks are weakened and that credit
supply is reduced, contributing to maintain the zone in recession. 
Aglietta and Brand (2013) clearly approve of shareholders’
involvement: “the best established principle of the market
economy is that it cannot function properly if the threat of bank-
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ruptcy is not effective for all private agents.” But are banks private
agents like any other agent? We would prefer a clear separation
between banks playing a quasi-public role (management of
deposits, loans to households, enterprises, public authorities) and
banks with financial market activities, the first would benefit from
a public guarantee directly by their State (and indirectly by the
ECB), the others not. 
The SRM project deprives the national authorities from all
powers. They would be obliged to obey the Single Resolution Board
instructions. The losses of a bank would be supported by all coun-
tries belonging to the banking union, thereby justifying a single
control. According to the project, the Commission and the SRB
would be able to decide to impose a resolution plan to a bank,
without the agreement of the relevant governments. It is an
important step toward European Federalism, which has not yet been
accepted by Germany, for instance, which claimed for more polit-
ical union though a constitutional reform before this hidden step. 
The implementation of the guidelines of this new authority
may be problematic. A banking group in difficulty may be
requested to sell its shares of large national groups. But will
national governments agree to expose a national champion to a
foreign control? As shown in the case of Dexia, the terms of a bank
restructuring can have serious consequences for the countries
where it was operating. Are governments (and citizens) willing to
lose all power in this area?
We cannot agree with the Finance Watch Report (2013), which
writes: “a bank resolution mechanism must not be left in the
hands of politicians, and even less of national interests” as if the
organisation of the banking system was a purely technical matter
and should not depend on economic policy choices made by the
Member States. 
Following the decisions of the 29 June 2012 Summit, Spain
could be the first country where banks would be directly recapital-
ised by the ESM. However, this would not occur before 2014; the
modalities of such a procedure and the impact of the ESM support
on the governance of recapitalised banks still have to be specified. 
The assistance to Spain agreed in summer 2012 foreshadows
what could the European procedure for banking failure resolution
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be. On 25 June 2012, the Spanish government requested assistance
from Europe to restructure and recapitalise its banking sector. The
29 June 2012 Summit agreed to that request and entrusted this task
to the ESM. The required conditions have been specified in a
Memorandum agreed by the European Council. The document
points out the weaknesses of the Spanish economy: growth
boosted by strong households’ and firms’ borrowing, persistent
external imbalances, a banking sector weakened by the burst of the
financial bubble in 2007, which faces very high interest rates on
the interbank market and implements credit rationing. The EU
assistance is designed to clean up balance sheets of Spanish banks,
which have a large amount of bad debts, to restore credit supply by
allowing the return of Spanish banks on the interbank market and
to improve financial sector’s transparency. 
The assistance programme has three steps: the detailed assess-
ment of the situation and needs of banks; their recapitalisation and
restructuring; the withdrawal of their bad debt in a bad bank,
created for this purpose (the AMC: Asset Management Company).
But the aid is awarded according to two sets of conditions, the first
one concerning banks, the second one Spanish governance. Based
on the results of stress tests, banks must offer recapitalization plans
that will be evaluated by the Spanish authorities, the EBA, the ECB,
the IMF and the European Commission. Banks had to achieve an
equity ratio of 9% in December 2012. The Commission, the EBA
and the ECB can examine the banks having received European aid
and may choose to liquidate an institution they consider too
fragile. The independence of the Central Bank of Spain and its
supervisory power should be strengthened. The Spanish authori-
ties must encourage disintermediation and financing through
markets. Finally, the Spanish Government must reduce public and
external deficits and undertake the structural reforms recom-
mended in the context of the European semester.
The aid was spread into two parts: a first part, a 39.5 billion
euros loan with an average maturity of 12.5 years has been agreed
in December 2012 by the Eurogroup and the ESM to support the
most vulnerable banks. All Spanish banks have run stress tests that
assessed their recapitalisation needs; their results were published in
September. Banks were then classified into four groups. The most
solid (without recapitalisation need) will be in group 0; Banco
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Santander, BBVA, La Caixa, Sabadell, Kutxabank, Bankinter and
Unicaja are part of this group according to the report by Oliver
Wyman’s firm. The four banks already nationalized by the Fund
for Orderly Bank Restructuring (FROB) are classified in Group 1.
Other Spanish banks are either in Group 2 (for those unable to
recapitalise on their own) or in Group 3 (for those which obtained
a delay until June 2013 to raise capital by themselves). Banco
Popular, MNB and the merged group between Ibercaja, Liberbank
and Caja 3 benefited from a delay until 2014 to recapitalise while
Catalunya Banco, NGC Banco, Banco de Valencia and Bankia must
present a restructuring plan and transfer their unsafe assets to the
bad bank, the Sareb. This institution, created on 1 December 2012,
will be able to buy assets up to 90 billion euros. According to
Fernando Restoy, the FROB president, haircuts applied to the loans
transferred to the bad bank will be 45.5% on average and haircuts
applied to real estate assets will reach 63% (see Birambaux, 2012).
Junior and hybrid debts will be converted into equity or will be
redeemed with a high discount. 
Spanish banks received the second part of 1.9 billion euros for
the recapitalization of the second group of banks in difficulty. The
Commission report from March 2013 (see, European Commission,
2013) is optimistic about the recovery of the sector and does not
expect other recapitalizations for the moment.
This ambitious assistance plan did not receive investors’ full
confidence: Spanish banks soundness is tested via stress tests.
However these stress tests had failed in 2011 to foresee Bankia’s
difficulties: are they really able now to assess the needs of Spanish
banks? Besides, this project monitoring is extremely complex. In
the absence of a European supervisor, Spanish public authorities
are responsible for the resolution: they are supported by the FROB,
the public fund introduced in 2010 to reform the banking sector.
The European Commission, the ECB, the EBA and the IMF monitor
the proper conduct of the proceedings and may intervene on site.
The difficulty of coordination of such an organisation diminishes
the credibility of the project. The drastic recapitalisation that
Spanish banks will have to perform may decrease credit avail-
ability, which will deepen recession in Spain. Spain has benefited
from a substantial drop in the interest rate it has to pay: from 6.5%
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in summer 2012 to 4.3% in April 2013, but Spanish GDP decreased
until middle 2013. 
In order to set the bases of the future European banking union,
the European banking crisis management could extend to all Euro-
pean banks balance sheets the withdrawal of bad loans to an Asset
Management Company. Since 2008, the United States has imple-
mented such a measure through their TARP: Troubled Asset Relief
Program, which was intended to clean the financial sector from its
toxic assets. The US Treasury also purchased preferred shares for
205 billion dollars in the benefit of 707 companies, in order to
strengthen financial institutions’ and banks’ own funds. On the
whole 389 billion dollars were mobilized for this project; banks and
other beneficiaries have currently refunded 80% of this amount. 
Note that the Bad bank strategy, which was successful in Sweden
in the beginning of the 90’s, has its dangers. In 1995, the Credit
Lyonnais, owned by the French State, was split into a healthy
entity pursuing the bank activity and a bad bank responsible to sell
all non-performing assets and activities of the Credit Lyonnais
(Blic, 2000). However the pooling of assets within this bad bank
generated a global fall in the value of transferred assets, the sale of
which was an additional cost for taxpayers.
The Cypriot crisis led to the first implementation of the new
method of banking crises resolution. European institutions refused
to go beyond an aid of 10 billion euros to Cyprus, considering that
this would have induced an unsustainable debt. They refused to
help directly a banking system they judge oversized for the
country, badly managed, specialized in money laundering and
securing dubious Russian assets. Thus, the new method has been
implemented: deposits are guaranteed up to 100.000 euros (after
an initial version of the plan, which awkwardly planned to tax
deposits under this level). Shareholders and creditors of Laiki, the
second bank of Cyprus, which will be closed down, lose all their
assets. The amounts of less than 100.000 euros deposits will be
transferred to the Bank of Cyprus. The amount of deposits in
excess of 100.000 euros is frozen and will be refunded according to
the results of the Bank’s assets liquidation (losses are estimated to
be of 60%). Debts and deposits over 100,000 euros at the Bank of
Cyprus, which is restructured, are frozen and will be partly
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converted into shares to recapitalize the Bank (in application of the
bail-in principle); their losses should amount to 40%. 
However, this implementation of the new European scheme of
crisis resolution revealed its weaknesses: banks have faced huge
withdrawals from depositors and were forced to close for several
days. Capital flows controls had to be introduced when banks
reopened. Frozen assets and losses for large deposits have affected
SMEs and some households doing real estate transaction, having
just received an inheritance or saving for their retirement. Above all,
Jeroen Dijsselbloem, the Eurogroup President, who said that the
model applied in Cyprus corresponded to the future practice of the
banking union, had to step back and pretend that the case of Cyprus
was unique. The Eurogroup and several leaders of the ECB made
similar statements, in full contradiction with on-going projects,
thus weakening the choice of bail-in as the method of resolution. 
3. The European deposit guarantee scheme
The banking union should include a European deposit guar-
antee scheme. A deposit guarantee system protects savers in case of
bank failure by refunding their deposits up to a certain ceiling. It is
one of the sovereign tasks of the State to provide citizens with a
risk free instrument of payment and saving. Customers do not
exactly know their bank’s financial health; the majority of deposi-
tors, with deposits not exceeding a certain amount, cannot be
asked to be interested in that; they are subject to information
asymmetries which, in normal times, promote confidence in credit
institutions. On the other hand, in a banking crisis, information
asymmetries between depositors and towards banks strengthen the
contagion of panic and cause a rush of investors seeking to with-
draw their deposits massively. Then liquidity crises turn into
solvency crises threatening to spillover to the entire banking
system. A bank failure deteriorates stakeholders’ confidence on the
interbank market and decreases credit supply; therefore, it has a
negative impact on the real economy halting activities that depend
on these credits and causing a sudden stop of investments.
However, it is necessary to distinguish between relatively small
deposit amounts, with interest rates incorporating no risk
premium, which must be guaranteed and other deposits, with
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interest rates incorporating risk premia for, deposits that should
rightfully bear the risk of losses.
The Diamond and Dybvig’s model (1983) shows that a bank run
is an undesirable equilibrium of the deposit contract in which all
depositors panic and withdraw their deposits, even if they would
prefer not to do so, pushing even healthy banks to fail. So a
government deposit insurance which guarantees that the promised
return will be paid to all who withdraw their funds, has a key social
benefit because it allows banks to follow a desirable asset liquida-
tion policy, separated from the cash-flow constraint imposed by
the panic of depositors. 
The harmonisation of the deposit guarantee level in Europe
would avoid that some countries attract deposits from their neigh-
bours by offering a full guarantee of deposits, a strategy
implemented by Ireland during the crisis, knowing that this full
guarantee may have heavy consequences for the population of the
country concerned. On the other hand, given the differences in
standards of living, the share of guaranteed deposits would widely
differ from one country to another.
There were, in 2010, 40 different deposit guarantee regimes in
the 27 EU countries (European Commission, 2010). Depending on
countries, these schemes are managed by the government, by
banks or by both. A group of banks may decide to create a common
private fund to guarantee their deposits according to specific rules
of their choice. EU lawmakers have developed the deposit guar-
antee via several directives: in 1994 [Directive 1994/19/CE] a first
legislative text set a minimum level of guarantee corresponding to
20.000 euros per depositor; it requires that each MS sets up offi-
cially a guarantee fund and that all credit institutions subscribe to
a guarantee scheme. The minimum level of guarantee was raised to
50.000 euros in 2009 and to 100.000 euros on 31 December 2010
[Directive 2009/14/CE]. 
In 2010, the European Commission put forward the idea of a
pan-European deposit guarantee system by 2014 [European
Commission, 2010]. It called for a networking of existing systems
by proposing the establishment of a mutual borrowing facility
between all funds and a gradual harmonisation of procedures. But
the European Parliament and the Council disagreed on how to
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harmonise the systems. The Member States wanted to reduce the
financing rate of funds paid by banks, while MEPs wanted to make
risky banks contribute more significantly via a system of risk
premium. An agreement was reached in December 2013: in each
MS, the target level for ex ante funds of DGS is 0.8% of covered
deposits to be paid by member banks. The target fund level must be
reached within a 10-year period. In case of insufficient ex ante
funds, DGS will collect immediate ex post contributions from the
banking sector, and, as a last resort, they will have access to alter-
native funding arrangements such as loans from public or private
third parties. Bank contributions to DGS will reflect individual risk
profiles. The Commission wishes now to launch discussions on the
establishment of a pan-European guarantee scheme.
It is necessary for the Scheme to guarantee all European banks
because if it covered initially only the strongest large transnational
banks, depositors would rush to guaranteed banks and this would
immediately increase the risk of a euro area break-up. Under the
assumption of a 100.000 euros guaranteed ceiling, the amount of
covered deposits would be 6.655 billion euros (European Commis-
sion, 2011). Compared to 2007 when regulations in Europe
requested a guarantee of 20.000 euros only, the amount of guaran-
teed deposits would be increased by 18% (+ 994 billion euros) and
the number of fully guaranteed deposits by 8% (+ 3 million
deposits) but, in the event of a funding through a levy of a certain
percentage of eligible deposits paid by banks, it would cost banks
815 million euros per year for 10 years on average in the EU which
corresponds to a 4% decrease in their annual profit for 10 years as
compared to 2007. 
The crisis has shown the contradiction between the more and
more internationalised structure of European banks and the
deposit guarantee which remained at the national level. The
problem turned out to be especially acute for countries like Ireland
or Cyprus where banking systems were oversized. This can be
prevented in two ways: setting the deposit guarantee at the Euro-
pean level or, on the contrary, setting limits to the size of each
country's banking sector, to prevent credit bubbles and the accu-
mulation of cross-border deposits, which are source of instability.
The first solution is preferred in Europe today. But the Cypriot
crisis will perhaps reopen the debate.
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The Spanish banking crisis recalled the need to protect public
finances in the event of bank failure, but in 2013, two issues
remain problematic. According to Schoenmaker and Gros (2012), a
banking union should be created under a “veil of ignorance”, i.e.
without knowing which country exhibits more risks: this is not the
case in Europe today. 
As the risk of a euro zone exit of a MS has not entirely disap-
peared, the question is: what guarantee would be provided by the
banking union for euro denominated deposits in case of a conver-
sion into national currency? A European guarantee on deposits in
euros is needed to prevent the capital flight away from countries
believed to be likely to leave the euro area. But in the current situa-
tion, given the risk that such a guarantee would have to apply for
some countries (Cyprus, Greece, Portugal or even Spain), it is diffi-
cult to implement due to the opposition of Northern countries. 
The European Commission has not chosen between a uniform
rate of contribution to the guarantee scheme and a variable rate
depending on the risk level of guaranteed institutions. The
majority of countries have a uniform assessment system, but
Canada and France have a variable risk pricing, which tends to
reduce banks’ moral hazard. 
Box 3.  The bank deposits guarantee in the United States
In the US, the deposit guarantee is provided by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), an independent federal agency created
in 1933 by the Glass Steagall Act, whose managers are appointed by the
President of the US and confirmed by the Senate. The FDIC mission is to
maintain public confidence in the US financial system. Almost all US
banks are affiliated with the FDIC even if membership is required only
for the bigger ones. UCITS and other collective funds are not insured.
Deposits are covered up to an individual amount of 100.000 dollars. The
FDIC guarantees more than half of the total amount of deposits in the
US. It also intervenes to limit bank failures: it inspects and controls
directly more than 53.000 banks, of which more than half are in the US.
It has means of resolutions of failures; the most common means is the
sale of deposits and credits to another institution. The FDIC resources
come from premiums by banking institutions and insured savings, and
from the certificates of association signed by the members at their
membership and from earnings on investment in US Treasury bills.
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Since 1993, the premium of credit institutions is based on their risk level
(Morel and Nakamura, 2000): with capital ratios (Cooke and Tier l
ratios) and a rating (determined according to five criteria: asset-liability
management, asset quality, management quality, results and liquidity),
the FDIC sets the institution's premium. Thus, until late 1995, the
premium of institutions to the guarantee fund varied between 0.09%
and 0.49% of deposits as determined by the FDIC depending on the
risks of each institution. In the 2010-2011 period, 249 banks went bank-
rupt in the US, which divided by three (from 17.7 billion to 6.5 billion)
the reserve available for possible losses of the guarantee Fund. The
current reserve fund represents 0.17% of covered deposits. The FDIC
plans to return to its long-term target, a reserve of 1.35% of deposits
covered by 2018 (FDIC, 2012).
3.1. A European deposit guarantee scheme difficult to settle
The European Commission has worked for several years on the
networking of European Union banking schemes. With the
banking union project being focused on the euro area, the area of
implementation of the guarantee fund remains undetermined; the
harmonisation of existing systems is tricky. If the fund is rapidly
introduced, there is a risk that it will have to deal with Southern
Europe countries’ difficulties, Germany or Finland possibly
refusing to contribute to this fund in order to avoid an increase in
wealth transfers from Northern to Southern Europe. Current proj-
ects do not specify if the fund will be financed by banks’
contributions ex ante or if it will be based on a State guarantee and
banks’ refund ex post. 
Schoenmaker and Gros (2012) propose that the European guar-
antee fund owns a permanent reserve representing 1.5% of covered
deposits (i.e. nearly 140 billion euros). But this would only cover
one or two major European banks’ deposits. The credibility of such
a fund in the event of a bank crisis with contagion risk is therefore
limited. The fund permanent reserves are inevitably small as
compared to the amount of deposits which need to be reimbursed
in the event of a systemic crisis. Only a fund supported by a mone-
tary authority can offer a full and credible guarantee in such an
event. Even if the fund can raise contributions from banks ex ante
in order to be able to intervene in the event of limited problems,
the deposit guarantee will continue to depend as a last resort on
the MS, on the ESM and on the ECB, these being requested to inter-
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vene in turn in the short-term, depending on the severity of the
problem. The guarantee should be unlimited, but the German
Constitution (and German political opinion) opposes such a guar-
antee. Banks’ contribution might intervene ex post to restore the
level of the guarantee fund and possibly repay the first in line cred-
itors. The difficult point remains to determine who pays for the
guarantee as a last resort, between banks and States, between the
country and the whole EU countries covered by the agreement.
Does this mean that the banking union necessarily requires setting
up a federal Treasury with a European tax (Aglietta and Brand,
2013) to cover this risk? This is probably excessive as the proba-
bility of such an event is very small.
The authority in charge of the fund is not yet settled. The ECB
will supervise the banking system, but it is much more difficult to
dedicate the management of the deposit guarantee scheme to it.
According to Repullo (2000), the deposit guarantee must be sepa-
rate from the function of lender of last resort. Otherwise, there
may be a fear that the ECB uses excessively money creation to
recapitalise banks, so that the monetary policy targets and support
to banks could be in conflict. Therefore a deposit guarantee and
crises resolution authority should be created. It should be separate
from the ECB, which would necessarily have a right to look at
banks behaviour, and would come in addition to the EBA, the ECB
and national regulators. Such an authority was introduced by the
French banking reform in 2013. On the other hand, the ECB
would continue to play its role of lender of last resort. The
viability of such a complicated system is unclear. We think that it
should be stated that the ECB will intervene, if necessary, to guar-
antee deposits in a situation where States or the ESM could not do
so, but that this intervention will only consist in a loan from the
ECB to the bank guarantee fund or to States, which they will have
to repay.
From 1979 to 2000, in France deposits were insured by the so-
called “solidarité de place” mechanism (financial centre solidarity).
In a crisis situation, the Governor of the Bank of France could
“organize the participation of all credit institutions to take the
necessary measures for the protection of the interests of depositors
and third parties, for the proper functioning of the banking system
as well as for the preservation of the reputation of the place”
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(translation from: Marini, 1999) This mechanism was only imple-
mented on one occasion, the bankruptcy of the Al Saudi Bank in
1988 (Goodhart, 1995). In case of a crisis the risk of a bank run
pushes banks to show solidarity and coordinate themselves to
avoid the effective implementation of this solidarity. Following
the introduction of a deposits guarantee fund in 2000, the French
Government chose to no longer mention this banking community
solidarity, considering that the fund organised a permanent soli-
darity. The advantage of the solidarité de place is that it is not
necessary to immobilise funds. Moreover the guarantee is a priori
unlimited and the bank in difficulty could be taken over by
another bank, which could be interested to do so to gain customers
and market shares. But this system only worked for problems in
small banks. 
The Cypriot crisis has shown that the common deposit guar-
antee is not easy to implement as long as the banks’ balance sheets
are not effectively cleaned up, as long as concerns on bank failures
remain and as long as banking systems are not under control in
Europe. The common guarantee can only be the last stage of the
banking union. 
The crisis also showed the limits of the 100,000 euros ceiling.
Some SMEs liquid assets, households’ funds waiting to be re-allo-
cated, etc. have been affected. Euro area countries must choose
between two strategies: offering all depositors the possibility to
have a fully guaranteed (at least in national currency)saving instru-
ment, with no ceiling, but with limited remuneration; or leave
depositors choose their bank, knowing that having funds in some
banks implies some risks which are difficult to assess. Finally, the
European institutions oblige shareholders, creditors and large
depositors of banks in difficulty to pay for the deposit guarantee by
aggregating the cost of this guarantee for the two banks in ques-
tion. Implicitly, they called for the “solidarité de place”, which
means that the European guarantee fund will have only a decora-
tive role. 
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4. What model for the euro area banking system? 
There is no single banking system in the euro area today, but
the juxtaposition of 18 domestic markets strongly divided by legal,
economic, social, historical and tax barriers. There is a European
interbank market and a competitive market for very large firms
financing but retail banking remains mainly national (Table 2).
Entering a domestic market goes through taking over existing enti-
ties. Until now, cross-border movements in own funds have been
rare and of limited size. 
A full banking union would involve direct competition between
all banks in the euro area, on a unified basis. This implies to cut the
links between the borrowers of a country (government, local
authorities, firms and households) and national banks. This
implies that the capacity of a bank to lend depends above all on its
Table 2. Cross-border penetration from EU countries*
In %
2007 2012
Belgium 21 51
Germany 10 11
Estonia 99 85
Ireland 39 29
Greece 23 16
Spain 11 9
France 11 10
Italy 18 13
Cyprus 26 17
Luxembourg 76 67
Malta 37 32
Netherlands 16 9
Austria 22 16
Portugal 23 20
Slovenia 29 29
Slovakia 86 96
Finland 65 67
Euro Area 17 16
* Cross-border penetration via branches and subsidiaries from  EU countries is reported as a percentage of total
banking assets.
Source: Schoenmaker and Peck (2014).
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solvency, own funds and financial markets’ assessment, under the
risk of blindness periods and excessive mistrust periods, which are
usual in financial markets.
One could prefer the opposite strategy: a restructuring of the
banking sector, where retail banks would be isolated from financial
markets, should focus on their core business (credit to local agents,
based on a detailed expertise, to domestic firms, households and
local authorities). Their solvency would be guaranteed first by the
prohibition of risky or speculative operations, and second by the
State, whose debt would be guaranteed by the Central Bank.
Certainly, a bank could be in trouble if its country is in a depres-
sion and if companies or households have difficulty in repaying
their debt, but the State may come to his rescue, especially as the
credits supplied by the bank fit into the domestic economic
strategy.
4.1. The universal bank model in Europe 
A choice needs to be made between two models: the universal
bank or the return to banking specialisation. Will the banking
union impose the separation of retail and investment banks? Will
it prevent banks with guaranteed deposits to intervene on financial
markets for their own account? Will it be a new step towards banks
financialisation or will it signal a return to the Rhineland model?
On the one hand, the crisis has questioned the relevance of the
universal bank model where deposits finance and guarantee
market activities. On the other hand, the crisis has shown the
fragility of specialised institutions which had an insufficient
deposit base and depended heavily on markets for refinancing.
Banks which in normal times used strong leverage effects to
achieve high profitability levels suffered particularly. After the
Lehman Brothers failure, banks such as Goldman Sachs or Morgan
Stanley abandoned the Investment Bank model, affiliated to the
Fed, strengthened their own funds, and can now collect deposits. 
In Europe, the shift towards universal banks induced major
structural changes. The rise in “non-banking” institutions such as
insurance or pension funds (the institutional investors) occurred at
the expense of the banks which had reacted by operating more and
more on financial markets, for their proprietary trading or as inter-
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mediates. The banking sector’s connection with the financial
sector increases contagion phenomena and the spreading out of
the financial crisis into the real economy. According to Paulet
(2000), there is an empirical link between the growing market
share of institutional investors and banking fragility, the former
strengthening the latter.  
The universal bank model, which combines the different
banking activities, has shown a better resilience during the finan-
cial crisis. The heavy losses of markets and investment banks
activities have been offset by their retail bank activities. However,
these losses have reduced banks’ own funds. This link between
banking activities destabilises retail banking activity which is
essential to the financing of the economy. It has also contributed
to the development of suspicion and concern on the strength and
stability of the European banking system. Applying “fair value”
accounting to the whole banks’ balance sheet facilitates the propa-
gation of the crisis: market fluctuations have an impact on credit
supply even if they should obey different logics. Accounting rules
should not be similar for so different activities: short-term for
market activity and long-term for credit supply. The universal bank
balance sheet is thus structurally opaque and fragile.
A better regulation of the EU banking system requires the sepa-
ration within banks of activities with different logics, procedures
and risks (Pollin, 2009, Scialom, 2012). The financial crisis has
affected the core functions of banks (their capacity to supply credit
and to manage means of payments), making it a serious crisis for
the real economy. As in the 1929 crisis, the real economy financing
has been interrupted. Banking regulation must be sought to avoid
the occurrence of such a crisis.
4.2. Should we return to the Glass-Steagall Act? 
As soon as in June 2009, the Obama administration published a
draft for a financial markets reform, the White Paper on Financial
Regulatory Reform. The United States in 2010, and the United
Kingdom in 2012, have decided to implement a separation
between investment and retail banking activities (Chow and Surti,
2011, Kregel, 2011). 
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The July 2011 US reform of the financial sector (Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act) introduces the
“Volcker Rule” designed to avoid that banks speculate against their
clients. It prohibits banks protected by the FDIC deposit guarantee
to run trading activities for their own account (proprietary trading)
and to own participation in investment funds (hedge funds,
private equity). These activities should be confined to a specific
structure. Subscriptions to investment funds may not amount to
more than 3% of the banks’ own funds. Banks can hold more than
3% of the capital of these funds. But the activities of market-maker
and hedging may remain in the bank. The rule should apply from
April 2014 but the Federal Reserve Board has extended the confor-
mance period until July 2015.7
In the United Kingdom, the Vickers report should be imple-
mented in 2019. Traditional banking activities (deposits and loans
to households and SMEs) will be confined in a specific structure
isolated from markets and investment activities. Transactions on
derivatives, market-making and market interventions will no
longer be made in the same bank as retail activities. However, the
classical bank could engage in some markets activities requested by
customers (exchange rate or interest rate risks hedging). Retail
banking should have independent governance and be separate
legally, in the form of a subsidiary for example.
In Europe, the Liikanen report (Liikanen, 2012) proposed to
separate risky financial activities from traditional banking activi-
ties by splitting banks into two separate entities. It contains five
proposals:
— The own account and financial activities should be included
in a separate legal entity. Activities for own account, posi-
tions on assets or derivatives resulting from markets
activities, unsecured loans to hedge funds, structured invest-
ment vehicles (SIV), investments in capital-risk, should be
separate. This would apply only if assets exceed a certain
7. From June 30, 2014, banking entities holding 50 billion dollars or more in consolidated
trading assets and liabilities will be required to report quantitative measurements. This will
apply to banking entities with at least 25 billion dollars, but less than 50 billion dollars, in
consolidated trading assets and liabilities from April 30, 2016; and to those with at least 10
billion dollars, but less than 25 billion dollars, in consolidated trading assets and liabilities from
December 31, 2016 (US Securities and Exchange Commission, 2013).
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level of the bank balance sheet (in % of assets or in volume).
However, the traditional bank could engage in some markets
activities requested by customers (interest rate and exchange
rate risks hedging). The financial institution will not be able
to be financed by guaranteed deposits. However, the report
does not advocate the introduction of two types of banks so
that retail banks can provide financial services to their
customers. The two banks will be allowed to be in a common
holding, but they will have separate capitalisations.
— Banks must develop banking crises resolution plans
controlled by the EBA.
— Banks must hold a large amount of own funds and junior
debt (which can absorb losses). Banks’ managers will have to
hold junior debt to be concerned by potential losses.
— Own funds requirements should be strengthened,
accounting better for the risk, particularly for market activi-
ties and real estate loans.
— Banks governance should be reformed through accounting
better for risk management, lowering bankers’ compensa-
tion, and tougher sanctions. 
Some European countries have taken the lead without waiting
for the potential introduction of European legislation based on this
report. Thus, in July 2013 France adopted a “law of separation and
regulation of bank activities”, intended to implement François
Hollande’s commitment “to separate the activities of banks that
are useful for investment and employment from their speculative
operations”. 
However, the French government refused to question the
universal bank French model. Speculative activities, narrowly
defined, will not be banned from retail banks, but will have to take
place in a subsidiary.
Thus, the law obliges banks to put in separate bodies their
“without any link with the service to customers” market activities.
Banks can continue to run operations “that are useful for the
economy”. But the notion of utility is not questioned. Is the devel-
opment of financial activities useful? Should non-financial agents
be encouraged to go to financial markets, to use toxic loans, struc-
tured investments, derivatives? Similarly, the customer’s concept
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has not been specified in order not to apply to hedge funds and to
speculative investment funds. 
Banks have argued that this project could reduce credit avail-
ability. It's a strange argument as credit creates deposits. Banks
would have to lend directly to firms and not through financial
markets or hedge funds. The prohibition of speculative activities
would sharply reduce banks capital requirements.
In theory, activities for own account are prohibited, but the
provision of financial services to customers (risk hedging), the
coverage of the own risk of the establishment (interest rate or
credit risk), market-making activity, the prudent management of
cash and long-term investments remain permitted. Hedge funds
ownership is prohibited, as well as unsecured loans to these funds,
but so-called secured loans are allowed. Packaging and marketing
of structured financial products like derivative products remain at
the level of retail banks. In total, the project isolates only 2% of
banking activity.
Speculative activities must be restricted within an autonomous
financial subsidiary. The latter will not be guaranteed by its parent
(and thus by public authorities), should finance itself inde-
pendently, can go bankrupt, and will need to develop a resolution
scheme showing that its bankruptcy may be borne by creditors. 
However, a prudential control and resolution authority (the
ACPR, Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel et de Résolution) will be settled.
It may prohibit certain activities. The Finance Minister may require
banks to limit the size of market operations carried out by the
parent company.
The ACPR will manage a deposit guarantee and resolution fund
(FGDR). Banks will have to develop a banking resolution plan
which will have to be approved by the ACPR. A bank may be
brought before the ACPR by the Bank of France Governor or by the
Treasury Director-general. The ACPR will be able to remove the
bank managers, to transfer the establishment, to make the FGDR
intervene, to make losses be borne by shareholders or creditors
(subordinate or junior), to ask them to bring new funds, to
prohibit the distribution of dividends, to appoint a provisional
administrator, to suspend managers compensations.
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The Financial Regulation and Systemic Risk Council becomes
the Financial Stability Board. It will have the right to increase the
capital requirements imposed on banks to prevent excessive credit
growth or to prevent a risk of instability of the financial system. It
will be able to set standards for the evolution of credit to avoid
increases in assets prices or excessive indebtedness.
The French government refused to prevent banks from having
activities in tax or regulatory havens, but banks will have to
publish a list of their subsidiaries abroad and the amount of their
activities.
This French law may look strange insofar as it addresses issues
which should be no longer under national legislation in two years,
if the banking union is introduced. This law raises once again the
issue of the link between national choices and decisions to be
taken at European level. For example, the law gives the right to the
ACPR to prohibit some too speculative activities, but will this be
enforceable if these activities remain authorized at the level of the
banking union. Will the French Finance Minister still have any
authority on banks in two years?
France is not the only country to have taken the lead. On 6
February 2013 the German government adopted legislation on
separation of banking activities (Trennbankengeset). Retail activities
should be split from the activities for own account when the latter
amount to more than 20% of the balance sheet or more than 100
billion euros; banks will have to deposit a will. This law applies
mainly to the largest two banks: Deutsche Bank and Commerz-
bank. It should be enforced from 2014, but banks will have an
additional one and a half year to proceed to the separation.
In view of these national initiatives and of the Liikanen report,
the Commission of economic and monetary affairs of the Euro-
pean Parliament urged the European Commission to propose a
European legislation for a separation of a Vickers’ type of banking
activities: activities necessary to the real economy must be
protected in a legally independent framework subsidiary. 
4.3. A European regulation proposal 
Under the initiative of the European Commissioner Michel
Barnier, the European Commission proposed on 29 January 2014 a
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regulation (European Commission, 2014) aiming to limit and to
supervise financial activities for systemic-sized banks (i.e. about 30
of the 8000 banks in the European Union, representing 65% of
European banking assets). 
This project is more demanding than the Liikanen report or
French or German laws. Like the Volker rule, it prohibits negotia-
tions for own account on financial instruments and raw materials
as well as investments in hedge funds. The supervisory authorities
will have the power to impose banks to separate in a subsidiary
body trading operations (such as market-making, complex deriva-
tives and securitization operations, that would be deemed too
risky, i.e. which induce too big positions financed by leverage). In
our view, it is a shame that this separation is a possibility open to
supervisors and not a strict obligation.
This reform proposal raises strong criticisms from some MS and
banking lobbies. France and Germany claim to have already made
their own banking reform. But the logic of the banking union is
that the same rules apply everywhere. These countries have chosen
to reform banking at the minimum to pre-empt the content of the
European law. This is not an acceptable behaviour at European
level. For the UK, the Barnier’s project opens a way out: the regula-
tion shall not apply to countries where legislation is more binding.
According to the banking union project, the ECB supervises
European banks and the EBA sets regulations and rules of the
supervision. The Commission can be accused to intervene in an
area that is no longer of its jurisdiction. Conversely, the crisis
clearly demonstrated that banking regulations are not only banks’
matters. It is legitimate for political authorities (Commission,
Council and Parliament) to be involved.
 Christian Noyer, Member of the Board of Governors of the
ECB, considered these proposals as “irresponsible”. According to
the European Banking Federation and the French Banking Federa-
tion (FBF), the universal banking model must be preserved. They
criticize the obligation to separate the market-making (including
the firms’ debts market). According to the FBF, this regulation will
“lead to a considerable increase in the cost of debt financing and
risk-hedging services for firms”. However, this requirement could
be waived if banks prove that their interventions in markets do not
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induce risks for them. Thus, banks could continue to play a role as
market-maker, provided that they set strict limits on their own
positions; they could provide simple hedge operations, by hedging
themselves. 
Certainly, European banks were right to point out that this
reform comes in addition to the establishment of the SSM, the
SRM, and banks scoring by the ECB. A more coherent schedule
should have been established. 
However, the separation advocated by the project would
increase the credibility of the banking union and of its three
pillars. The establishment of a consistent framework would
simplify the SSM (the ECB should monitor ‘normal’ banking activi-
ties and ensure that speculative activities do not disturb them. The
SRM would gain credibility: the losses from market activities would
not affect banks credit and would not be supported by the
taxpayers. By reducing the risk of failure of retail banks, it reduces
the risk to have to activate the deposit insurance. In this sense,
regulation could become the fourth pillar of the banking union.
However, it will not be discussed before the election of a new
parliament and the establishment of a new Commission. It will
have to overcome the opposition of the big European banks.
4.4. Two European projects? 
On 28 September 2011 the European Commission adopted a
proposal for a directive on a common system of financial transac-
tion tax (FTT). The European directive proposed to tax shares and
bonds transactions at 0.1% and derivative contracts transactions
at 0.01%. The gain was estimated to be 57 billion euros for the
whole EU. 
In the absence of a European agreement, and since August 2012,
France has introduced a FTT, which includes a 0.2% tax on French
shares purchases, a 0.01% tax on cancelled orders within HF trading
in France, a 0.01% tax on naked CDS (which have been prohibited
in France since 1 November 2012). The FTT was expected to raise
1.6 billion euros in full year. However, according to NYSE
Euronext, the amount of securities transactions subject to the FTT
has declined by about 15% in two months. The French FTT does
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not apply to derivatives and some operators have therefore
switched to this market.
A true FTT, applying to all banks and financial institutions
financial transactions, would have three advantages: it would
reduce the profitability of speculative activities, it would decrease
financial markets liquidity, it would oblige banks to control better
the operations of their market operators.
Eleven EU countries (France, Germany, Belgium, Portugal,
Slovenia, Austria, Greece, Italy, Spain, Slovakia and Estonia) plan
to introduce a FTT in the framework of enhanced cooperation. The
European Commission assesses the potential of the tax revenues at
between 30 to 35 billion euros (incorporating a decrease by 15% in
the amount of the transactions). 
Of course, the risk is high that European financial transactions
are relocated in London and Luxembourg, but, in this case, the
euro area will have to react, which will highlight the strategic
differences on financial regulation within Europe. The banking
union will have to choose between being an open area, with no
specific rules, or a relatively closed area, with specific rules. 
Yet the Commission's text is designed to prevent delocalisation:
taxation will apply if one of the parties to the transaction is estab-
lished in a participating country, regardless where the transaction
is made (residency principle) but also if the transaction involves a
financial instrument issued in a participating country (residence
principle). Will the text resist the pressure from banking and finan-
cial lobbies and from the UK? The UK has introduced a legal
challenge against the FTT at the Court of Justice of the European
Union. The French government is proposing a watered down
version of the text that affect buyers of stocks and bonds, and not
financial speculators.
European banks continue to have subsidiaries in tax and regula-
tory havens, particularly in Luxembourg, Switzerland, Guernsey,
Jersey, Bermuda Islands, Cayman Islands… The reporting obliga-
tion (a bank must declare to the tax authorities of its residence
country the financial incomes of their clients) faces opposition
from Luxembourg, Austria, and Switzerland. Europe should widen
the list of tax and regulatory havens countries, should prohibit
European banks and firms to locate profits and operate in these
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countries, unless there is a specific justification linked to non-
financial activities.
On these two issues, the banking union will have to make polit-
ical choices. Who will have this responsibility in Europe? 
4.5. What banks? What credit? 
The problem remains: what financial system does the euro area
need? Should the ability of euro area banks be in a position to
compete more with Anglo-Saxon institutions or should their role
in financing the economy be increased? Should we build a
complex and unenforceable regulation, running behind financial
innovations? It would have been better that the European institu-
tions adopt the clear objective to reduce the weight of finance in
the economy. Some speculative activities should be prohibited;
most speculative activities should be prohibited for the banking
system; they should be confined to specialized institutions, not
guaranteed by the government, their financing cost would be high,
which would reduce their profitability and their operations.
Europe needs a productive and industrial recovery. But it is
necessary to define carefully the nature of this recovery. It must fit
with the ecological transition. Industrial choices that engage
future economic development cannot be left to shareholders, to
financial funds looking for short term profitability, or even to the
large companies’ managers. The society must guide the evolution
of the industry towards green, efficient and innovative techniques,
to promote energy savings, renewable energies, financing urban
renewal and collective transports.
This is the industrial policy in the broad sense which must
ensure productive recovery which should include: 
— a product axis: to promote the production of sustainable
products, compatible with ecological requirements; 
— a planning axis: to collectively define the sectors to promote,
to develop cooperative strategies between large companies
and SMEs, between public and private research. 
— a sectorial axis: to identify areas for the future and to main-
tain the basic economic sectors, which play a structuring role
and which are rich in employment;
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— a production axis: to improve the working community, the
promotion and the training of employees rather than the
financialisation, the business leader and the sprawl of the
income hierarchy. 
This ambitious strategy must be financed by national banks for
sustainable development. They must develop a strong capacity for
prospective; be able to take risks, on industrial, ecological and
employment criteria and have a strong financial capacity both in
equity and credit. Projects may be regional, national or European.
The objective must be to collect a large part of European savings,
rewarded at low but guaranteed rates. These banks must develop
simple and short circuits between household savings and loans to
productive sectors, to local authorities, and to housing. This
project could give another dimension to the banking union.
5. Conclusion
The challenge is huge: the euro area needs a strong banking
system, able to finance growth recovery and to bring the economy
out of the crisis. However, Europe has to make a clear political
choice between two options. 
A liberal option focuses on markets sentiment; banks are firms
like any other firm; they must maximize their profit; they must be
able to intervene freely on financial markets: they must be able to
provide sophisticated investment and hedging tools to their
customers. A unified European financial market will contribute to
the European banking system regulation (see, for instance, Sapir
and Wolff, 2013). However, there is a first risk is that banks chose
market activities which are more profitable than credit supply.
There is a second risk that banks are weakened, suffer from a rise in
the cost of their resources (due to higher risks for their creditors to
loss their claims if the bank runs into difficulty), and need to
reduce their credit activities under the effects of higher capital
ratios constraints. The third risk is that the link kept between
banks and financial markets spreads out financial markets insta-
bility into the real economy banks’ lending capacity would depend
on their solvency, thus on their own funds, and so on markets’
assessment, with the risk of switching from blindness to excessive
distrust periods. 
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A more interventionist point of view stresses the need to protect
specific banking activities (like credit distribution and deposit
management), to isolate them from financial markets, to protect
them by a public guarantee, to allow them to supply credit
according to the needs of the real economy. 
Another choice also has to be done: a European banking system,
unrelated with national agents and states, with open competition
of all banks in the euro area on unified basis; or the persistence of
national systems, which would maintain a strong link with their
territory. Will states be able tomorrow to intervene to influence
banking credit, to rescue banks which are vital for certain sectors of
the economy, to develop specific public banks? These choices
cannot be left to the ECB, which is more concerned with the
proper functioning of financial markets than with the real
economy. These choices should not be hidden by short-term
requirements, like rescuing Spain. They must be the subject of a
democratic debate in Europe. 
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